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Abstract
High-dimensional quantum key distribution (QKD) offers the possibility of encoding multiple
bits of key on a single entangled photon pair. An experimentally promising approach to realizing
this is to use energy–time entanglement. Currently, however, the control of very high-
dimensional entangled photons is challenging. We present a simple and experimentally compact
approach, which is based on a cavity that allows one to measure two different bases: the time of
arrival and another that is approximately mutually unbiased to the arrival time. We quantify the
errors in the setup, due both to the approximate nature of the mutually unbiased measurement and
as a result of experimental errors. It is shown that the protocol can be adapted using a cut-off so that
it is robust against the considered errors, even within the regime of up to 10 bits per photon pair.
Keywords: quantum cryptography, quantum communication, quantum optics
(Some ﬁgures may appear in colour only in the online journal)
1. Introduction
One of the central insights of quantum information is that
quantum mechanics allow for the safe distribution crypto-
graphic keys. This insight has blossomed into the ﬁeld of
quantum key distribution (QKD) [1–4]. Broadly speaking,
there are two main types of QKD protocols: entanglement
based schemes [5–8] and send and receive protocols, which
do not make use of entanglement [9, 10]. In the former, the
security is guaranteed by non-locality, whereas in the latter, the
security follows by the virtue of the uncertainty principle.
An essential feature of most QKD protocols is the
requirement to measure in two or more bases that are
mutually unbiased with respect to one another [11]. For the
simplest implementations of QKD, this does not pose a sig-
niﬁcant problem. For example, it is common in QKD to
encode information in the polarization of a photon. In this
case, the task of measuring in two mutually unbiased bases
(MUBs) can be easily achieved by using two polarizing beam
splitters. If information is encoded on different optical
degrees of freedom, however, then the task of measuring in
two MUBs can be experimentally challenging.
The use of high dimensional states within QKD greatly
increases the amount of information that can be encoded on
each state. For optical implementations of QKD, this allows
one to encode multiple bits of secret key on each photon. For
example, it has been shown that under reasonable experi-
mental conditions, one can encode over 10 bits per photon
[12], which requires control over in excess of 1000 states.
Furthermore, high dimensional states have been shown to be
more robust to certain types of noise [13, 14]. There are
several different photonic degrees of freedom that one can
exploit in order to encode multiple bits per photon. One
approach is to use the spatial modes of photons generated by
spontaneous parametric down conversion. It has been shown,
for example, that such photons can be entangled in their orbital
angular momentum [15–18]. The difﬁculty in coupling orbital
angular momentum states into ﬁbers suggests that this
approach is best used for free space communication, for which
atmospheric effects become important [19].
Another approach is to use the arrival time of a photon.
The basic idea is to divide the photonʼs arrival time into
discrete time slots or time bins. In principle, if we have M
time bins, then we could extract up to Mlog ( )
2
bits per
photon. It is possible to generate photon pairs that are
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entangled in their arrival time, so called energy–time entan-
glement. These states have already been used within experi-
mental QKD protocols [8, 20–28, 44]. If such states are to be
useful for high-dimensional QKD, then we must be able to
measure in a basis that is mutually unbiased with respect to
the time of arrival. This is a non-trivial task, however, when
the number of time bins is large.
In this paper we present a simple and compact experi-
mental setup for time-bin based high-dimensional QKD
protocols. The approach is based on a reconﬁgured Mach–
Zehnder interferometer that acts as a cavity. This setup allows
one to project onto a single state that is approximately
mutually unbiased to the arrival time. We will show how this
can be used within a simple entanglement based QKD pro-
tocol. The performance of this protocol is then analysed in the
presence of experimental imperfections. A key ﬁnding is that
the protocol is robust to reasonable experimental errors.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we
review the problem of implementing a measurement that is
mutually unbiased with respect to the time of arrival. The
interferometer/cavity based scheme is reviewed in section 3.
In section 4 we describe an entanglement based QKD pro-
tocol that is based on the cavity. The effects of experimental
errors is investigated in section 5. We ﬁnd that dark counts
cause signiﬁcant errors in the high-dimensional limit.
Nevertheless, it is shown that this does not pose a serious
problem as one can reduce the effect of such errors by using a
simple trick. Finally, we discuss our results in section 6.
2. Mutually unbiased measurements
Suppose we have a d-level system, in which we will measure
in one of two orthonormal bases { }am and { }bn . These
bases are mutually unbiased to one another if
=a b d1 , (1)m n 2
∀ ∈ …m n d, {1, 2, , } [29, 30]. From a physical perspec-
tive, MUBs extend the notion of complementary observables
to systems that are described using ﬁnite dimensional Hilbert
spaces [31].
MUBs play a pivotal role in the security of QKD. They
are used in most proofs of the security of QKD [32–37]. In
particular, they are used in recent security proofs of QKD
using qudits (d-level systems) [14, 38, 39]. The d-dimensional
system that we will investigate is formed from the arrival time
of a photon, which is split into a series of discrete intervals or
time bins. There are many physical systems that naturally
cause a photonʼs arrival time to be time-binned. For example,
a photon in a cavity or optical network, where the output has a
partially reﬂecting mirror. The photon would then have a
ﬁnite chance of being emitted or be forced to take another trip
of the cavity before it could be emitted again. One can also
consider source of entangled photons that are naturally time-
binned. One example is a mode-locked laser that pumps a
nonlinear crystal that can produce pairs of down-converted
photons [22].
Let n represent the state corresponding to a photon
being in the nth time bin. Measuring the photonʼs time of
arrival will be equivalent to projecting onto the basis ∣ 〉n{ }.
We label the d time slots, and hence also the basis states, from
1 to d. In practice, a timing measurement could have a better
resolution than the spacing of each time bin. One could then
determine which time bin the photon was in and discard the
record of the exact time the photon was detected. Such a
measurement procedure is equivalent to projecting onto the
basis states ∣ 〉n{ }.
If we are to exploit the time of arrival for QKD, then we
must also measure within another basis that is mutually
unbiased with respect to the basis ∣ 〉n{ }. One such MUB is
∑φ π= −
= … −
=
−
⎜ ⎟⎛⎝
⎞
⎠d
ink
d
d n
k d
1
exp
2
,
0, 1, , 1. (2)
k
n
d
0
1
It can be seen that φ =m d1/
n
2
. One way of realizing a
measurement in the basis φ{ }k , which works for =d 2N , is
to us a linear optical network of Franson interferometers
[40, 41]. This approach requires one to align −d 1 inter-
ferometers, which would be challenging even for small values
of d. The difﬁculty in projecting onto the states φ
n
has led
people to consider alternative approaches to securing high
dimensional time-binned QKD. One proposed method is to
use just a single Franson interferometer [25, 42, 43]. It has
been argued that in an entanglement based protocol, a single
pair of Franson interferometers would be sufﬁcient to detect
any disturbance of the entanglement. It can be shown, how-
ever, that this will only be true if one can perform the
experiment with a very high value for the visibility1. For
example, if one were to encode 10 bits per photon, then to
secure half of the bits against an attack with multiple temporal
peaks, a visibility greater than 99.8% is required [40].
3. Realizing MUBs using a cavity
The problem with realizing a measurement in a basis such as
(2) is that it requires us to project onto states which are a
superposition of d time bins. The optical network outlined in
[40] solves this problem by using various delay lines and
beam-splitters, so as to allow photon amplitudes in different
time slots to interfere. This inevitably increased the com-
plexity of the experimental setup. In particular, the number of
interferometers scales exponentially with the number of bits
that one can encode on each photon2.
1 We must stress that this is only true when one wants to encode a large
number of bits per photon, e.g. 10 bits per photon pair. It has been shown that
one can encode 3–4 bits per photon pair securely using a Franson
interferometer [44].
2 The number of interferometers scales linearly with the number of time
bins, or equivalently, the dimensions of the Hilbert space [41]. The problem
is, however, that the number of bits per photon is the log of the number of
time bins. This leads to an exponential scaling of the number of
interferometer with the number of bits per photons.
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An alternative approach is to use a cavity like system.
This would allow us to interfere light from different times
within the cavity. By carefully designing the cavity, one can
use this interference to construct a measurement that is a
very good approximation to projecting onto the states φ
k
.
The approach we take is to use the setup described in in [45].
The cavity is essentially a modiﬁed Mach–Zehnder inter-
ferometer, as shown in ﬁgure 1. The two beam-splitters are
both chosen to be highly reﬂective. The phase shifter imparts
a phase shift of θ. In addition to this, reﬂections at the two
beam-splitters will also give a phase shift. For a single round
trip of the cavity, a photon would pickup a phase shift of
ϕ θ π= + .
The way this setup works is described in detail in [45].
However, for the sake of completeness, we will give a brief
outline3. Detecting a photon at D1, within the time slots 1 to
d, corresponds to measuring within the time of arrival basis,
n{ }. We measure within the MUB whenever we detect a
photon at D2 within a time slot ⩾N d . To understand why
this is, it helps to consider how the interferometer acts on a
single photon input.
Suppose we have the single photon state
ξ = ∑ −γe d k
k
i k . Furthermore, suppose we get a click
at D2, within the Nth time-bin, where ⩾N d and that we do
not obtain a click at D1. The fact that we do not see
photons at D1 is important. In principle there can be inter-
ference at BS1 between the amplitude of the incoming
photon and the amplitudes already within the cavity. How-
ever, the fact that we do not observe photons at D1 means
that we are, in effect, post-selecting a photon that has
entered the cavity.
One could image that the photon we detected at D2 could
have originated from the dth input slot. It would thus have
taken −N d round trips of the cavity before exiting and
would thus have acquired a phase of ϕ−i N dexp [ ( ) ].
Alternatively, the photon could have originated from the
−d 1 time slot. This would have taken − +N d 1 round trips
and acquired a phase of ϕ− +i N dexp [ ( 1) ] before exiting
the cavity. One can extend this argument to see that each of
the d time bins could have been the origin of the photon that
was detected. As we have no prior knowledge of the emission
time of the photon, the detection of the photon in the output
time slot N, will thus correspond to projecting onto some
superposition of time-bins. A simple calculation shows that
detecting a photon at D2, within a time slot N ( ⩾N d ) can be
equivalent to projecting onto
∑
Γ ϕ =
× −
ϕ
ϕ
− −
=
−⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
( )
( )
T T R R e
R R e d n
( )
, (3)
N
N d i N d
n
d
n in
1 2 1 2
( )
0
1
1 2
where Ti and Ri are the transmission and reﬂection coefﬁcients
for the ith beam-splitter, with i = 1, 2. If we set ϕ π= k d2 /
and make R1 and R2 close to one, then this state approx-
imates φ
k
. However, the closer R1 and R2 are to one, the
longer we must wait to observe a click at D2. This will effect
the count rate; for more details see [45]. The prefactor
−( )R R N d1 2 takes account of the fact that the probability of
obtaining a click decreases with time. This is a simple con-
sequence of the fact that we are more likely to detect the
photon at earlier times. We thus see that obtaining a click
within any time bin, ⩾N d , corresponds to projecting onto a
state that approximates φ
k
. If we obtain a click at D2 within
a time slot that is less than d, then we do not project onto the
desired state as all d components have not full entered the
cavity.
As we have stated, if we obtain a click at D2, then we
shouldnʼt observe a click at D1. We are in essence post-
selecting on a photon entering the cavity. However, even if all
the photon amplitudes enter the cavity, we could still observe
a click at D1. One important example is if the single photon
state ξ was orthogonal to Γ ϕ( )N , then the inference within
the cavity should ensure that never register a click at D2, for
⩾N d .
We have not considered the fact that a cavity cannot
preserve the coherence of any state indeﬁnitely. In particular,
there will come a time for which the coherence between the
photon amplitudes, in different time-bins, is lost. For this
reason we impose an upper limit for when a click at D2 will
project onto (3). Let ′N be the last acceptable time slot. The
maximum allowed value for ′N will depend on the choice of
the reﬂectivities [46]. We see that we only project onto (3)
whenever we get a click at D2 within the a time bin N, where
⩽ ⩽ ′d N N .
The value of the total phase shift ϕ can be altered by
adjusting the phase shifter. By choosing ϕ π= k d2 / , we can
approximately project onto φ
k
. It is thus possible to
approximately project onto any of the basis states φ{ }k , by
simply changing the phase shifter. One can thus obtain the
full measurement statistics for the basis φ{ }k .
One important point about this scheme is that we can
only project onto one of the states φ
k
for a given phase
Figure 1. Diagram of the modiﬁed Mach–Zehnder interferometer.
The elements BS1 and BS2 are both highly reﬂecting beamsplitters
and PS is a phase shifter, which imparts a phase shift of θ. The total
phase shift for a single round trip is thus ϕ θ π= + . Detection of a
photon at D2 corresponds to a security check, while detection at D1
gives the time of arrival information and hence the key bits.
3 Issues such as the effects of spectral ﬁltering of the cavity will not be
considered. Instead, one should refer to [45] for a discussion on such matters.
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setting. This means that it is not suitable for use within QKD
protocols where information is encoded on both of the bases,
i.e. n{ } and φ{ }k . Instead, we could use the time of
arrival basis to encode the key bits, while using the other
MUB to check for an eavesdropper. In this way, our approach
is similar to the alternative protocols using within some
security proofs in QKD [32]. Another point to note is that we
do not measure each basis equally often. The fact that
≈R R 11 2 implies that we make timing measurements
much more often than we make security checks. This is
reminiscent of the modiﬁed BB84 protocol introduced by
Hoi-Kwong Lo et al [47]. QKD protocols with an asymmetry
in the bases, tend to more efﬁcient than symmetric protocols
in the sense that one losses less data during the sifting stage.
The price one pays for this is that to ensure security, we
require error rates that are lower than for symmetric proto-
cols [47, 48].
4. Entanglement based QKD protocol
We have outlined how one can measure within two different
bases using the experimental setup shown in ﬁgure 1. In this
section we will explain how this setup can be integrated into
a time-bin based QKD protocol. If the QKD protocol is to
work correctly, then we will also have to investigate how
well the states Γ ϕ( )N , approximate the true MUB states
φ
k
.
The setup is compatible with both entanglement based
and send and receive protocols. For the sake of deﬁniteness,
we shall explain how the experimental setup can be inte-
grated into an entanglement based protocol. This will
require both Alice and Bob to each have the interferometer
shown in ﬁgure 1. The errors within each interferometer will
thus be combined. Hence, an entanglement based scenario is
a more stringent test of the setup than a send and receive
protocol.
Assume that we have two parties, Alice and Bob, that are
trying to establish a shared secret key. This will be achieved
by Alice generating a two photon entangled state and keeping
one of the photons, while sending Bob the other photon. It is
important to stress that the source of the entangled photons is
under Aliceʼs control. Alice will generate an entangled two
photon state of the form
∑ψ = − −
=
−
d
d n d n
1
. (4)AB
n
d
A B
0
1
We see that the arrival time of the two photons are per-
fectly correlated, i.e., Alice and Bob should always ﬁnd
photons within the same time bin. This correlation will be
used to encode the shared random key bits. The state,
ψ ,AB can also be expressed in the basis φk , which gives
the result
∑ψ φ φ=
=
−
−d
1
, (5)AB
n
d
n A n B
0
1
where φ φ=− −n d n . The two-photon state is thus perfectly
anti-correlated in the basis (2).
An eavesdropper, Eve, could intercept the photon sent to
Bob. Eveʼs aim is to extract the photonʼs timing information,
as this is where the key bits are encoded. However, this will
inevitably disturb the correlation within the basis φ{ }k .
Alice and Bob can thus detect Eve by checking the correlation
within the basis φ{ }k .
A straightforward approach would be the following.
Alice and Bob will each have the setup shown in ﬁgure 1.
The correlation in the basis φ{ }k means that if Alice
projects onto the state φ
n
, then Bobʼs photon will be in the
state φ −d n . This implies that if Bobʼs total phase shift is not
set to ϕ π= −d n d2 ( )/ , then he should not obtain a click at
D2 within a time bin N, which is ⩾d . The presence of clicks
for uncorrelated phase settings indicate that the correlation
in (5) has been disturbed. This would, in turn, imply that Eve
is intercepting Bobʼs photons. The error can thus be deﬁned
as the fraction of clicks at D2, that correspond to uncorre-
lated phase settings. The full statistics for the MUB can be
obtained by Alice and Bob each using d settings for their
phase shifter. Provided the error introduced by the approx-
imate nature of the MUB measurement is low, then Alice
and Bob could use the setup to implement a secure QKD
protocol.
An experimentally simpler approach would be for Alice
and Bob to use only two phase settings. This is equivalent to
projection onto only two of the basis states φ
k
. While this
would not provide Alice and Bob with the full statistics for
the two MUBs, it would still be sufﬁce to check the corre-
lation in equation (5). There are two advantages to this
approach. Firstly, the arrangement is simpler that using d
settings for the phase shifter and is thus well suited for
establishing how well the setup approximately projects onto
the states φ
k
. Secondly, the number of phase settings scales
exponentially with the number of bits per photon. For
instance, if we wanted to encode up to 10 bits per photon pair,
then we would require at least 1024 time-bins and phase
settings. Such a large number of different settings requires a
large number of experimental runs to acquire a signiﬁcant
amount of data for the security analysis. This problem is
compounded by the count rate decreasing for large d, due to
the reﬂectivities needing to be large. For further details on
how the count rate varies with d, see [45]. For these stated
reasons, we will analyse a protocol that uses only two phase
settings. Nevertheless, the results we ﬁnd can be easily extend
to a protocol that uses d settings.
Suppose that Aliceʼs phase settings ϕ
A
are either 0 or
πk d2 / , then Bobʼs settings will be ϕ =
B
0 or π −d k d2 ( )/ . Let
ϕ ϕ′ ( )P ,NAB A B be the total probability for Alice and Bob to both
obtain clicks at D2 in time bins within the interval
4
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⩽ ⩽ ′d N NA B, , for the phase settings ϕA and ϕB, hence
〈∑ ∑ϕ ϕ Γ ϕ Γ ϕ ψ= ⊗′
=
′
=
′
( ) ( )( )P , . (6)NAB A B
m d
N
n d
N
m A n B AB
2
The probability to obtain an error can then be deﬁned as
π π
π π
π π
=
− +
+ −
+ − +
′ ′
′ ′
′ ′
⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟
⎜ ⎟
⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟
⎛
⎝
⎞
⎠
⎛
⎝
⎞
⎠
⎛
⎝
⎞
⎠
⎛
⎝
⎞
⎠
⎛
⎝
⎞
⎠
P
P
d k
d
P
k
d
P P
k
d
d k
d
P
d k
d
P
k
d
0,
2 ( ) 2
, 0
(0, 0)
2
,
2 ( )
0,
2 ( ) 2
, 0
. (7)E
N
AB
N
AB
N
AB
N
AB
N
AB
N
AB
A straightforward calculation shows that
π
=
−
− + +
− ⎜ ⎟
⎡⎣
⎛
⎝
⎞
⎠
⎤
⎦⎥
( )
( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )
P
R R
R R R R
R R
k
d
1
1 1
2 cos
2
. (8)E
1 2
2 2
1 2
2 2
1 2
4
1 2
2
The probability of error is plotted in ﬁgure 2 for
=R R1 2 , d = 1024 (10 bits per photon) and k = 512, which
corresponds to ϕ = 0
A B,
and π. The plot shows that PE
decreases as | |R1,2 are increased. This conﬁrms the intuition
that as R1 and R2 tend to one, the state (3) becomes a better
approximation of the desired state, φ| 〉. This means that by
choosing sufﬁciently large values for R1 and R2 , we can
make the errors due to the approximate nature of our mea-
surements arbitrarily small. This must be balanced against the
fact that the larger R1 and R2 are, the greater the time
needed to acquire the necessary security data. This tradeoff is
important for experimental implementations.
One can get a feel for the tradeoff between error and
count rate by looking at some examples. For simplicity, we
set = =R R R1 2 . Suppose we want =P 0.01E when
d = 1024; this is achieved when =R 0.9042 . The count rate
will depend on ϕ ϕ′ ( )P ,NAB A B . For ′ =N 2048, we ﬁnd that the
probability for Alice and Bob to both see clicks at D2, for
ϕ ϕ=
A B
, is π π= =′ ′P P(0, 0) ( , ) 0.076NAB NAB . If instead we
wanted =P 0.05E , again for d = 1024, then we should have
chosen =R 0.7922 . Using this choice for | |R with a cutoff of
′ =N 2048, we ﬁnd that π π= ≈′ ′P P(0, 0) ( , ) 0.1NAB NAB .
The probability of error, PE , depends on the product of
R1 and R2 . We have some freedom, therefore, in the exact
choice of the reﬂectivities. In ﬁgure 2 and in the examples in
the next section, we set =R R1 2 . There could be situations,
however, where it is advantageous to allow the reﬂectivities to
be different. For example, R1 determines the probability to
make either a timing measurement or to measure within the
other basis. It is useful to be able to modify R1 without
affecting PE . This can be achieved by choosing ≠R R1 2 .
A further factor to consider is the effect of experimental
errors. This is of fundamental importance for all practical
QKD schemes. In our case we have the added complications
that we have errors even in the absence of experimental noise.
It is thus vital that we analyse the robustness of the scheme
against experimental imperfections.
5. The effects of experimental errors
The ﬁrst effect to consider is the that of misalignment in the
path length of the interferometer. If the misalignment is too
great, then the interference between the different time bins
will be completely lost. If the scheme is to function correctly,
then the misalignment must be made small. Nevertheless, a
small misalignment will still have an effect on the intended
interference. One can model this by assuming that the time
bins inside the interferometer are shifted in time by a small
amount relative to the incoming modes. This will led to the
summation in equation (3) being modiﬁed. The effect is
equivalent to introducing a positive term ξ ⩽ 1, such that the
term ( )R R n1 2 in the summation is replaced by
ξ( )R R n1 2 . The larger the misalignment is, the smaller ξ
will be. The effect of a misalignment on the error probability,
can thus be thought of as decreasing the coefﬁcients of
transmission and reﬂection.
Another very important source of errors is in the detec-
tors. Real detectors are inefﬁcient and have dark counts and
jitter. We will assume that Alice and Bobʼs detectors are
identical and share the same imperfections. The effects of
statistical jitter will be to change the time bin we detect the
photons in. With regards to the timing measurement, jitter
will set a limit on the sizes of our time bins. The reason for
this is that if we chose a width that is small relative to the
detectors response, then this will result in signiﬁcant errors in
the timing measurements. The effects of jitter on the security
measurements is not so severe. This is because the protocol
does not require us to obtain a click within a speciﬁc time bin.
Similarly, Alice and Bob do not both need to obtain clicks at
D2 within the same time slot. However, if we choose the
width of the time bins to be too small, then there can be an
effect due to jitter making us think we detect a photon in a
time slot ⩾N d , when it should have been detected in a time
bin before d. This would mean that we have not had a chance
to observe interference between all of the time bins. The
Figure 2. A plot of error probability, PE , as a function of
= =R R R2 1
2
2
2
, for d = 1024 time bins. The value of =k d /2,
hence ϕ = 0
A
and π /2, while ϕ = 0
B
and π /2.
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effect of this error is small, however, and can be removed
complete by either increasing the width of the time-bins or
excluding detection events that occur sufﬁciently near to the
dth time slot. The latter option would result in a slightly
decreasing the amount data for the security check.
Suppose that Alice and Bobʼs detectors have an efﬁ-
ciency η, which is less than one. This means that we have a
ﬁnite probability for not registering photons that are incident
on the detectors. Taken in isolation, the effect of detector
inefﬁciencies is just to decrease the probability ϕ ϕ′ ( )P ,NAB A B ;
the error rate is not increased. In contrast, dark counts will
effect the observed error rate. Let q be the probability for
Alice and Bob to register a dark count in any given time bin.
It is possible for Alice and Bob to both obtain dark counts
within the same time bin. These clicks are uncorrelated and
can lead to errors. The situation is exacerbated when detector
inefﬁciencies are combined with dark counts. To see why,
consider the case where Alice and Bob should both detect
photons at D2. The inefﬁciency of Bobʼs detector means that
he might not register a click, but could instead see a dark
count at D3.
The effects of the imperfect detectors will thus change
the probability of error from that given in equation (8). Using
the fact that π π= −′ ′( ) ( )P k d P d k d2 / , 0 0, 2 ( )/NAB NAB and
π π= −′ ′ ( )P P k d d k d(0, 0) 2 / , 2 ( )/NAB NAB , we ﬁnd that the
error probability is
γ π
γ π
′ = +
+ +
′
′ ′
⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
P N
P n d Q
P n d P Q
( )
(2 , 0)
(2 , 0) (0, 0) 2
, (9)E
N
AB
N
AB
N
AB
2
2
γ η η η= − + − −where (1 Q) 2 (1 )Q (1 Q),2 2
and where = ′Q qN . The errors in the alignment will be
included in the probabilities ϕ ϕ′ ( )P ,NAB A B . We will assume
that the error for jitter is either so small that it can be ignored
or we disregard clicks in time bins that are sufﬁciently near to
the dth time bin, which changes the probability ϕ ϕ′ ( )P ,NAB A B .
The error probability for 8 and 1024 time bins is plotted
in ﬁgure 3. In all of the plots we assume that the time bins
have a width of 130ps and that the detectors have a dark count
rate of 300 counts per second. The probability to see a dark
count in any given time bin is thus = × −q 3.9 10 8. In prac-
tice, one would have a threshold for tolerable errors. For the
sake of illustration, we can take this threshold to be
′ =P N( ) 0.01E , i.e. 1%. This threshold is indicated in the
ﬁgure by the red dotted line. An important conclusion to draw
from both ﬁgures 3(a) and (b), is that ′P N( )E can be less than
0.01 for suitable values of the reﬂectivities. For example, for
8 time bins and η = 0.1, we can obtain an error less than 0.01
by setting = ⩾R R 0.9051
2
2
2
. Similarly, the error can be
made less than 2% (i.e. ′ =P N( ) 0.02E ) by choosing
= ⩾R R 0.891
2
2
2
.
An interesting feature of the curves is the appearance of a
trade-off with respect to how the errors vary with the reﬂec-
tivities. Previously, we found that increasing R1 and R2
would decrease the errors (see ﬁgure 2). When dark counts
are included, we ﬁnd that there becomes a point where
increasing the reﬂectivity will eventually make the errors
worse. The position of the minium will depend on both the
dark count probability q and the efﬁciency η. The minimum
occurs due to the fact that the longer we wait for a click, the
more likely we are to see a dark counts. When the reﬂectivity
is large, the photons will spend longer in the interferometer
which increases our chances of getting a dark count. This also
explains why the error gets worse as η decreases. When η is
small, we will lose photons, which increases the average time
we must wait to detect a photon.
The effects of dark counts can be minimized if we
decrease the time we wait to see a photon in each experi-
mental run. One way of achieving this is to decrease ′N .
Recall that any photons detected in time-bins after ′N , are not
counted as security events. Decreasing ′N will thus decrease
the error, but at the expense of decreasing the available
measurement results. If we are to be sure that an eavesdropper
is not intercepting Bobʼs photons, then we require a sufﬁcient
number of security events. We thus see that if we decrease ′N ,
then we would need to compensate for the loss of data by
performing more experimental runs.
Figure 3. Two plots of error probability, PE , as a function of
= =R R R2 1
2
2
2
. The value of =k d /2, hence ϕ = 0
A
and π /2,
while ϕ = 0
B
and π /2. Both plots are for = × −q 3.9 10 8, which
corresponds to a dark count rate of 300 counts per second and time
bins of width 130ps. Plot (a) is for d = 8 time bins and ′ =N 800,
while (b) is for d = 1024 time bins and ′ =N 1200. In each plot the
black line corresponds to the case of η = 1, while the dotted and
dashed blue line is for η = 0.1. The dotted red line indicate the point
where the error probability is 1%.
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One can gain further insight into this trade-off by looking
at a simple example. Consider the case of d = 1024, η = 0.1,
= × −q 3.9 10 8, i.e. the parameters used in ﬁgure 3(b). In the
absence of dark counts, then a typical value for ′N would be
′ = =N d2 2048. For = = =R R R 0.921
2
2
2 2 , the
observed error is approximately 1.5%. The cut-off used in
ﬁgure 3(b) was ′ =N 1200, which lead to an error of less than
1%, when =R 0.922 . The decrease in error is accompanied
by a decrease in the count rate of approximately 37%.
6. Conclusion
We have described a compact setup for high-dimensional,
time-bin based QKD. This approach offers the promise of
encoding multiple key bits on each photon. In particular,
entanglement based protocols have been shown to allow for
10 bits to be encoded on each photon pair, under realistic but
challenging experimental conditions [12].
The setup was based on a modiﬁed Mach–Zehnder
interferometer that operated as a cavity. The cavity enables
one to implement measurements in two different bases, which
were approximately mutually unbiased to each other. We then
explained how this could be used within an entanglement
based QKD protocol. It was shown that one can encode the
key bits within the time of arrival information, while checking
for an eavesdropper using the other basis. An important
practical point was that we needed only two different phases
settings to observe a disturbance in the temporal correlation
within an entangled photon pair.
We studied the probability to introduce errors due the
approximate nature of the mutually unbiased measurement. It
was found that this error could be make arbitrarily low by
increasing the reﬂectivity of the two beam splitters. We also
investigated the effects of reasonable errors on the scheme. It
was found that presence of dark counts introduce a trade-off
in the choice of reﬂectivity. The effects of dark counts and
detector inefﬁciencies were found to be quite small for a
reasonable number of time bins. For larger numbers of time
bins, say 1024, then one can decrease the cut-off time for
accepted security checks. This will decrease the errors due to
dark counts, but at a cost of decreasing the number of valid
security events one gets for a given period of time. Crucially,
we found that the error could be made as low as 1%. This
demonstrates the robustness of the setup to errors.
A key beneﬁt of our protocol is that it is compact and
only requires a single interferometer each for Alice and Bob.
This contrast sharply with alternative approaches to high-
dimensional QKD, which would require complicated net-
works of interferometers. Furthermore, the approach uses
mutually unbiased measurements, which ensures that the
security can be analysed using existing approaches.
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